Willingness to pay for climate change mitigation depends on people's perceptions about just how bad things will get if nothing is done. Individual subjective distributions for future climate conditions are combined with stated preference discrete choice data over alternative climate policies to estimate individual option prices (the appropriate ex ante welfare measure in the face of uncertainty) for climate change mitigation. We find significant "scope" effects in the estimated option prices-according to both expected conditions and degree of uncertainty.
Introduction
The willingness of the voting public to incur substantial costs in order to prevent climate change will be a key determinant of the success or failure of domestic and international climate policy. Consequently, it is important to gain some understanding about how individuals formulate subjective conceptions of future climate prospects in the absence of mitigation, and how these opinions translate into willingness to pay for climate change mitigation in terms of higher prices or taxes.
Global climate change does seem to have the potential to result in detectable shifts in the distributions of many environmental measures. Past scientific controversy over the nature and magnitude of these changes, however, has made it very difficult for legislators to agree on optimal climate change policies. Some constituencies cannot even agree on the necessity for costly measures to mitigate climate change. In democratic jurisdictions, support for legislation to manage the world's climate depends on the distribution in the population of individuals' ex ante willingness to pay to avoid the perceived consequences of failing to act. Citizens are asked to vote on policies (directly or indirectly) in advance of knowing the resolution of uncertainty about what will happen if nothing is done. What do people perceive to be the consequences of pursuing no special policies to manage the world's climate? Individuals who have lived for some time in a particular location have become accustomed to the typical patterns of seasonal temperatures, rainfall, cloud cover, 1 Some early research on the topic of how people make judgments in the presence of uncertainty is described in Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and humidity in their local area. Absent any appreciation of the forces that might produce systematic changes in these climate variables, individuals may assume that the current average patterns will persist indefinitely. Other people have begun to recognize that, without policies to prevent these changes, shifts in the distributions of their local climate variables may occur. make the point that in stated preference assessment of the demand for a public good, subjects who are queried about their willingness pay for the provision of the good will approach the question with two types of information. First, they are likely to have different amounts of "native information" (prior knowledge or past experience with the type of good in question). Second, the researcher will typically provide additional information about the nature of the good in an effort to induce the subject to respond on the ideal basis of "full information" as prescribed by Arrow, et al. (1993) . Researchers will sometimes proceed on the assumption that the information provided in the survey itself represents the complete information set upon which individuals are making their policy choices. Here, we delve further into the issue of heterogeneous subjective information.
In a separate paper, Cameron (2002) , we describe models intended to capture the nature of the opinion-updating process as survey respondents are exposed to external information about the probable future state of the world's climate. The present paper focuses on an analysis of the same subjects' willingness to pay to prevent climate change. This willingness to pay is elicited using a referendum-type stated preference question (Arrow, et al. (1993) ).
The objective of this analysis is modest. We wish to set forth a simple illustration that captures the most important features of any model intended to measure the social benefits of climate change mitigation: individual subjective uncertainty and estimation in terms of option prices formally derived from a common underlying indirect utility function that allows for heterogeneous preferences across individuals. The importance of incorporating these features is illustrated using a convenience sample, rather than a representative population sample, so further research is clearly warranted. We find that individual support for climate change mitigation programs depends not only on the anticipated scope of climate change, but also on the individual's degree of uncertainty about this scope. Furthermore, the effects of scope and uncertainty are not constant across individuals, but vary systematically with a number of sociodemographic and attitudinal characteristics.
How does this line of inquiry differ from the existing literature on climate change mitigation benefits? An early study that prompted much discussion in the literature was Mendelsohn, et al. (1994) . These authors use county-level data on farmland prices for the US to develop a detailed climate and agriculture model. They control for non-climatic variables (including population density, latitude, altitude, and physical properties of the land in each county) and focus on the effects of interpolated county-level 30-year averages for normal daily mean temperature and normal monthly precipitation for January, April, July, and October. Their cropland models suggest annual damages on the order of 4-5% of gross farm income. Their crop revenue models, however, suggest about a 1% gain in revenue. However, scientifically forecasted climate changes and econometrically forecasted changes in agricultural revenues or cropland values are not necessarily an accurate or complete measure of the average citizen's perceptions of the climate problem and their willingness to support policies that will end up costing them money.
Work by Layton and Brown (2000) is much more relevant to the present study, although it still deals with only one type of climate change impact. These authors also use stated preference techniques, in this case to value a range of potential forest losses due to climate change. The program choices that were presented to respondents differed randomly in the level of forest loss that would ensue, whether forest management activities were involved, whether climate change abatement was included, and in the cost of the programs. Random parameters logit models were employed to ascertain that willingness to pay to prevent forest loss of different extents and over two different time horizons. Layton and Levine (2002) also employ the data from the Layton and Brown study but use a novel hierarchical Bayesian model to focus on the questions of scope effects (i.e. the idea that differing expectations about future climate conditions should produce a different willingness to pay to prevent climate change) and individual discount rates for climate change policy choices.
The present paper differs from Mendelsohn, et al. (1994) , Layton and Brown (2000) and Layton and Levine (2002) in that demand for climate change mitigation is modeled as a derived demand for the control of future annual average temperatures in the respondent's region. We focus on the individual respondent's perceptions about this underlying climate variable, rather than on market or non-market demands for just some subset of climate services, such as agriculture or the maintenance of forest ecosystems. In addition, we emphasize the fact that, for many people, there is likely to be uncertainty about future climate conditions. In addition to verifying the existence of simple scope effects, we explore for the presence of uncertainty effects. When people's perceptions about climate change differ, both in terms of mean and variance, do these differences show up in their willingness to support climate change mitigation programs?
Section 2 reviews (in the general case) the modeling of option prices for environmental protection in the context of discrete-choice stated preference survey data. Uncertainty is captured by crude measures of the moments of respondents' subjective probability density functions for just one representative continuous dimension of future environmental quality: average annual temperatures in the respondent's region. Section 3 gives a concrete example in terms of a particular simple functional form for state-dependent individual indirect utility.
Section 4 describes a convenience sample of college student data that allows the basic model to be tested, and Section 5 discusses the empirical results based on these data. Section 6 outlines some illustrative simulations that are possible using the estimated model, and Section 7 concludes.
A Generic Model
Suppose we are interested in determining an ex ante measure of the social value of preventing a deterioration in environmental quality. (In our application, environmental quality will refer to regional climate conditions.) Suppose initially that environmental quality can be conveniently summarized (in just one dimension) as the level of a continuous variable, . For example, in the context of climate change, one could think of t as annual average temperatures.
t
Assume that if mitigation is undertaken (at known cost), environmental quality at the current level, t , is guaranteed. If society fails to mitigate, the level of environmental quality is likely to worsen, but individuals are subjectively uncertain as to the extent of this deterioration. From the point of view of a single individual, let this uncertain future outcome--in the absence of intervention--be t . When called upon to make an evaluation about whether to undertake mitigation efforts, individuals decide whether or not to pay to prevent environmental degradation based on their current perceived distribution for , which we will label t ( ) f t . The way in which individuals formulate their own subjective distributions for (partly in response to information t from external sources) is one of the main issues in an associated paper (Cameron (2002) ), but discussion of this topic will be minimized in the present paper.
a.) General Discussion of Option Prices from Referendum Stated Preference Responses
Under uncertainty, the appropriate measure of the social value of preventing environmental deterioration from t to t is the option price (OP) for this change. An option price in this context is that one common certain payment (an amount to be paid regardless of which way the uncertainty is resolved) that yields the same expected utility as the set of (differing) payments that would be separately optimal for each possible state of the world if it occurred with certainty. or an empirical adaptation in an environmental economics context by .) Identical intuition can be brought to bear on a problem with a continuum of possible states of the world, where uncertainty is represented by a continuous probability density function, rather than simply the discrete probabilities of an event and its complement.
In order to estimate option prices empirically, it is expedient to work with a class of indirect utility functions that is additively separable in some monotonic function of income, . 
The individual will prefer to pay amount , and thereby to preserve current environmental
If one particular value of t was to occur with certainty, the individual's maximum willingness to pay ( for preventing environmental deterioration from to specific level could be found by setting ( to zero and solving for , which will of course differ with t . Simplify by 
} An ex post measure of consumer welfare, across all possible states of the world --usually called the "expected surplus"--could then be calculated by computing the probability-weighted average of these state-dependent WTP values, namely, the expectation over t :
We use the term "state-dependent" in the same sense as it is used in Hirshleifer and Riley (1992) . Preferences differ across the uncertain outcomes (states of the world), but only because the state of the world is an argument of a more-general specification of the individual's utility function.
( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( )
When explicit functional forms have been selected for , and , this integral can typically be simplified.
However, this ex post measure is not appropriate for ex ante policy decisions. The option price ( is the preferred measure, and is defined by:
Substituting the generic expression for the indirect utility difference (from equation (2) into (6)) yields:
Solving this equation for OP yields the desired option price. One can simplify the notation by using to denote an expectation over states of the world t .
This analysis cannot be taken much further without committing to a specific functional form, especially for the function . Thus, we proceed in the next section to adopt one simple concrete assumption for an empirically tractable functional form.
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Example: A Specific Functional Form
We require a simple functional form for the state-dependent indirect utility function that exhibits risk aversion and therefore allows ex ante option prices to differ from the ex post expected surplus measures. One such model is linear in the logarithm of income. Since t differs across the mitigate/don't-mitigate stated preference scenarios concerning climate change, indirect utility can be linear in . However, we also desire to allow the dispersion of the respondent's subjective distribution of future environmental quality to affect option prices. It is therefore expedient to allow indirect utility to depend upon the squared deviation between realized t and its ex ante expected value,
A simple and tractable specific form for the model is therefore:
This symmetric loss function, for departures from , still leaves something to be desired, but it is a useful and tractable starting point. The utility-difference function, which also depends on the uncertain outcome with respect to t , is then:
In practice, each of the indirect utility parameters in this specification can be expressed as a systematic function of observable (exogenous) respondent attributes, in order to allow for heterogeneity in preferences. For example, we might let 0 0 ' x
where the vector x may differ across these three systematic varying parameters. Also let 1 0 ε ε ε = − . Note that if can be assumed to be certain, the term
) Option Prices from Referendum Stated Preference Responses
As in the generic case, OP is the common certain payment that has the same expected utility as no payment and no mitigation (or the same expected utility as the set of each of the separately optimal payments under each possible outcome with certainty). The binary probit discrete choice model (to be used to estimate OP) is based on the expectation of the utility difference across all possible outcomes for t . For the simple indirect utility difference specification illustrated above, this expectation takes the form:
t f t dt t E t t E t f t dt
If we assume that with mitigation, the current level of environmental quality can be sustained with certainty, this can be simplified as follows:
Since the remaining expression involving an integral is simply the negative of the variance of t , 
For a sample of survey respondents, we can now provide an inventory of the data required in order to estimate the model. The dependent variable is the discrete YES/NO response to the willingness to pay for mitigation question. Explanatory variables must be constructed from data on income, , the referendum offered value, , the certain level of environmental quality with mitigation t , and individual characteristics [
To solve the estimated probit discrete choice model for option prices in this concrete example, recall that OP is the value of c that makes the expected utility difference exactly zero.
Substituting OP for c (and simplifying the notation to highlight the essentials), the OP equation, for each individual, will take the following form: 
In the discussion of the empirical results later in this paper, we will also refer to the quantity
{ }
E OP as willingness to pay . ( ) WTP
A Modest Sample of Data
After two rounds of pretests, a pencil-and-paper questionnaire was distributed to Summer Session undergraduate economics classes. Students received a five minute introduction to the survey during the lecture period and were requested to return the completed survey by the next lecture.
6 A second round of sampling was conducted in two classes in the Fall quarter of that same year, and a third round of sampling, using similar classes, took place during the subsequent Fall quarter. Table 1 gives descriptive statistics for the estimating sample. 6 The Summer Session 1977 samples employed no incentives and yielded a rather low response rate, as expected.
The Fall 1997 (SMPL2) and Fall 1998 (SMPL3) samples were collected in the author's own Principles of Economics classes and Applied Regression Analysis classes. In these courses, the survey was integrated into the instruction in segments concerning the non-market valuation of public goods and the application of nonlinear simultaneous equations and probit models. Nominal extra credit was attached to submitting an anonymous survey and a detached "receipt" with the student's name and section number. This protocol was designed to preserve anonymity yet reward participation. The number of surveys collected was only slightly smaller than the number of receipts turned in, and only a handful of submitted survey instruments were turned in blank. Given the exploratory nature of the sample, we obviously did not (and could not) pursue non-respondents. This is undeniably a "sample of convenience" so it would be heroic to attempt to extrapolate the findings from this sample concerning mean option prices to the population as a whole. Nevertheless, this sample can be used to demonstrate that there can be systematic differences across individuals in perceptions about future climate conditions and that these different perceptions can influence willingness to pay for climate change mitigation. Any given group of college students can be different from the population as a whole, but the extent to which they differ may depend upon the type of college, the students' majors, or the courses they are taking when surveyed. The most important differences are likely to be age-or cohortrelated.
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An anonymous referee has summed up some of the issues: "college students are the age group closest to adult status that are also most likely to be living at the time we see effects of these policies. Thus, under this view they are the ones that should be answering these questions.
A key caveat is that if the votes are taken by all today and cost experienced today, we must reflect others' views as well."
a. Data on Respondents' Opinions about Future Environmental Conditions
A preliminary task in this study involves establishing the determinants of the moments of 7 Harrison and Lesley (1996) , however, find that an inexpensive student sample yields essentially identical results to those provided by litigation-quality research in the Exxon Valdez case.
8 Using data from another study ), we have created a dummy variable for the youngest 19-to 25-year age group (2.3% of the 1737 people in the sample), and separately for the 19-to 29-year age group (6.7% of the sample). These dummy variables were allowed to shift both the intercept and the slope of the implicit willingness-to-pay function, for the "best" model in that study. For the 19-25 group, the intercept term was statistically significantly different but only at the 10% level. The slope term was not statistically different. When the 19-29 group is distinguished from the rest, the intercept term is not statistically different, but the slope term is significantly different, although only just at the 10% level. Perhaps due to the small numbers of "youths" in these two different subsamples, these tests are inconclusive as to whether WTP for environmental non-market goods differs significantly from that of adults. Davies, et al. (1987) ). This literature focuses on the best way to convey to individuals the true objective magnitudes of risks.
There has been less attention devoted to the problem of eliciting subjective probabilities. Reliable elicitation of (at least) the means and variances of subjective probability distributions is crucial to this analysis.
10
In economics, the topics of (i.) individuals' risk perceptions, (ii.) how these risk perceptions respond to information, and (iii.) the value of risk changes, have been fertile areas for research. Some representative studies include Smith and Desvousges (1987) , Smith and Desvousges (1988) , Smith and Johnson (1988) , Viscusi (1985) , Viscusi (1985) , Viscusi and Magat (1992) , Viscusi, et al. (1986) , and Viscusi and O'Connor (1984) . In almost all cases, however, the risks under consideration are physical health or workplace risks. But "risk" can be defined more broadly to include preferences over uncertain outcomes more generally.
For climate change, the variable that we designate to illustrate the uncertainty is annual average temperature during a decade twenty years into the future. At the beginning of the survey, we elicit from the respondent their initial assumptions about the future distribution of the variable. Historical data are provided for the weather station nearest the respondent.
Provision of this information insures that the respondent is making his or her forecast for the expected value and dispersion of future mean temperatures (for the decade of 2011-2020) based on valid current data.
t After establishing the true local annual average temperature, we first elicit information on 9 The issue of long-term environmental risks is addressed in Fischhoff (1990) . 10 Benson, et al. (1995) address the role of belief assessment in the process of eliciting probabilities.
the mean and dispersion of the individual's native subjective distribution for future environmental quality. Expected values seem relatively easy to elicit. It is more difficult to ask respondents to convey information on variances. For dispersion measures, we have elected to ask for "plus" and "minus" amounts relative to their expected value (and described as a 95% range), and then to interpret this as four standard deviations, squaring 0.25 times this amount to yield a variance approximation.
Once these prior distributions have been established, the respondent is presented with information describing the distributions of future average temperatures (purportedly) forecasted by government scientists and by environmental groups. 11 One objective of the larger study was to discriminate among the effects of different external information sources on the respondent's distributional updating process. The design of the different survey versions ensures that there is orthogonal variation across respondents in these purported external forecasts.
After the external information on future climate has been provided, respondents are invited to update their priors on the distribution of future annual average temperatures, giving both a new expected value and a new 95% range (which we convert to a variance, again invoking strong distributional assumptions). In the present paper, these updated posterior distributions constitute the information set used by respondents at the moment they make their stated choice about climate change policy. A thorough analysis of the updating process from native priors to posterior distributions is contained in Cameron (2002) . To the extent that there is heterogeneity in this updating process, changes in population characteristics can be expected 11 This information is part of the experimental design of the survey. All stylized forecasts fall within the range of assorted actual forecasts. Concerning survey research ethics, there is the delicate matter of not lying to respondents. Since we are purposefully vague about the precisely which "government scientists" and "environmental groups" have made these forecasts, there may be some natural attenuation of the credibility assigned by respondents to these opinions. Respondents were debriefed after the sample period.
to alter the way external information is combined with priors to generate the posterior information used in policy choices. In the present paper, however, we take these posterior distributions as given and explore their effects on stated climate policy choices. [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] . In other words, putting these policies in place would allow society to avoid any of the consequences (bad or good) to be expected if we do nothing.
The monthly costs of the policy are assigned randomly, in ten different amounts, presented in the following form:
Suppose that these policies will mean higher prices and/or higher taxes so that by the year 2000, your monthly household costs will be higher by $______ (in 1997 dollars) for as long as these policies are followed. Respondents are then asked if they would vote in favor of this package of policies, given their expected income and these costs. They are then probed to detect "protest bids." The last part of the survey collects sociodemographic and attitudinal variables, including the respondent's perceptions of bias (for or against the policy) on the part of the research team.
The basic option price model can be estimated using data on: the YES/NO response to this question, the exogenously assigned value of monthly costs, , imposed for this respondent, c information on other sociodemographic characteristics, , current environmental quality t 6. Empirical Findings How willing are respondents to vote in favor of the climate change mitigation policies at different levels of cost? Given the microeconomic theory behind our estimating specification, and with sufficient confidence in stated preference information, the discrete choice probit model explaining stated voting behavior can be used to infer fitted estimates of individuals' option prices for climate change mitigation. Table 2 displays the results from some preliminary models in terms of expected values (E) and variances (V) using our exploratory sample. These models are labeled as "EV" specifications. Note that for all respondents in this sample.
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Our most basic estimating specification is derived theoretically from a utility difference function with three parameters (the coefficients 0 and [ ] Var t respectively). Introducing respondent heterogeneity (potentially) generalizes each of these three parameters to a linear function of individual attributes. This is how we accommodate preferences that differ according to the observable characteristics of different groups of respondents. 13 We have employed in our models, rather than
.5 E t   −   . This will have no substantive effect whatsoever in the formal linear or ad hoc quadratic models (only sign changes in some coefficients), but it facilitates later consideration of ad hoc logarithmic specifications.
Model EV-1 is the most rudimentary specification, since it assumes homogeneous preferences. The initial term, lo , ought always to be important, since it captures both the effect of income and that of policy costs. It is solidly significant in all the specifications shown in Table 2 . In Model EV-1, however, while the coefficient on the simple indirect utility function we chose for illustration leads to a linear empirical specification. For welfare calculations, however, we do not need to recover the underlying utility function from the utility-difference specification. It seems reasonable, then, to explore generalizations of our basic theoretical model that may prove to be more compatible with the empirical data.
Linear-in-variables specifications can sometimes obscure strong non-linear relationships.
Model EV-2 in Table 2 There are also very few data points to support some extremely high fitted WT implied by the fully quadratic model for scenarios that display little expected change in temperature but are high on the uncertainty dimension. It is conceivable that in order for the quadratic form to adequately fit the curvature in the surface over the mass of the data, the coefficients on the squared and interaction terms produce these high WT values over the sparsely populated domain merely as an artifact of achieving the best fit over the densely populated domain. It seems we need to explore models that allow for curvature, but do not, for example, force a change in sign for as uncertainty about future average temperatures increases. variables.
In Figure 1, 
1/ 1
Var t + ) become statistically insignificant in Model EV-5, the interaction terms involving these variables remain significant, so they are retained in the model.
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An anonymous reviewer drew our attention to the theme in Cook and Graham (1977) , Anderson (1979) , Graham (1981) and Graham (1984) that the central element in determining the shape of the option price function is how the marginal utility of income changes with the events at risk. This reviewer recommended that that we verify our assumed independence of the marginal utility of log income from the distribution of future annual average temperatures. We + . Neither of these interaction terms bears a coefficient that is individually significant and the maximized value of the log-likelihood improves by only 0.91 for these two additional sources of systematic variation in the marginal 16 The introduction of larger possible costs ($200 and $300) in the second wave of the survey instrument could have the potential to increase implied willingness-to-pay values since these higher values present respondents with an opportunity to say "yes" to a larger bid. Nevertheless, there is no statistically significant shift in willingness to utility of log income. It appears that the fit of the model is not greatly compromised by assuming separability between income and climate effects.
Model EV-5 will be considered our preferred specification in this class of models. The implications of this model are clearest if we use a three-dimensional plot. Figure 1 shows the resulting surface. The vertical dimension measures fitted monthly WT in constant 1997 dollars. We have benchmarked this surface for an income level of $40,000 (approximately the average household income in 1998), despite the fact that these students optimistically expect their future incomes to be over $60,000 in constant 1997 dollar terms, on average. The WT surface is furthermore depicted for males with neutral levels on the scales for informedness and conservatism.
P P
17 The vertical scale ranges from $0 to $500. Clearly, there are scope effects in willingness to pay to prevent climate change. The greater the amount of climate change that respondents expect they are preventing, the more they are willing to pay. With certainty that temperatures will remain just as they have been (at 63.5 degrees Fahrenheit), WT for climate change mitigation programs is very small. The more certain the respondent is about a given increase in average temperatures, the more he or she is willing to pay per month to prevent such an increase. Uncertainty appears to dampen the effect of the scope of expected climate change on willingness to pay to prevent it, but even with substantial uncertainty, scope effects appear to remain. Given that attempts to include squared terms in
Model 5 did not improve the log-likelihood, it appears that WT is monotonic in both
[ ]
Var t over the range of our data.
pay is evidenced for different waves of the survey in the family of models presented in Table 2 .
Why is WTP decreasing, rather than increasing with uncertainty? In the usual story about the risk premia associated with gambles, we are considering uncertainty concerning the level of a good (typically income). Total utility is assumed to be increasing with income, but at a decreasing rate, so that the marginal utility of income is positive, but declining. The result is that a positive risk premium must be added to a gamble (in terms of income) to make the individual indifferent between a gamble and a sure payment with the same expected value as the gamble.
In contrast, in the climate change context, the uncertainty concerns future annual average temperatures. Higher temperatures appear to be perceived, on average, as bads, rather than goods. Total utility is declining in future annual average temperatures. Marginal utility is negative and seems to be declining with increases in future annual average temperatures. When marginal utility is negative, uncertainty is associated with a negative risk premium. Hence, the greater the uncertainty about future climate, the less people are willing to pay to sustain current climate patterns.
Construct validity is an important factor in any assessment of a fitted model of WT .
We consider the sensitivity of the shape of the WT surface to gender, informedness about environmental issues, and the respondent's degree of conservatism, respectively. Female students are willing to pay more than males, greater informedness means greater willingness to pay, and greater conservatism means lower willingness to pay. These findings are intuitively plausible.
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Note that three additional variables were considered in the most extensive forms of all specifications discussed in this paper: RES. BIAS (researcher bias), and SMPL2 and SMPL3
(dummy variables for two of the main subsamples of data). None of these three variables appears to have a statistically significant effect on WT in any specification. P
Simulations
The estimated coefficients on the FEMALE, INFORM, and CONSERV variables convey the differences in the fitted WTP function for individuals with different characteristics. We have also conducted a few simple simulation exercises to demonstrate the implications of our model for how WT in our sample would differ under a number of counterfactual conditions concerning individuals' expectations and uncertainty about future climate conditions in the absence of mitigation programs.
P
Simulations are necessary because the point estimates of option price are non-linear functions of the data and the estimated model parameters. Equation (15), or its analogs for different specifications, can be used to produce point estimates of WT (the expected value of ) for each individual in the sample. One can report fitted WT at the means of the data. An alternative is to report descriptive statistics for these fitted point estimates (the median and lower and upper quartiles) calculated across all individuals in the sample. We provide both in Table 3 .
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For these simulations, we employ the indirect utility-difference probit equation of Model EV-5 in Table 2 . The first two lines in the body of Table 3 display descriptive statistics for fitted expected option prices (with expected future monthly income statistics for comparison). Option price point estimates (WT ) range widely in the sample, with all of this variation attributable to differences in expected income and other individual attributes. per month may seem high, it remains less than 5% of average expected future monthly income.
Note that confidence intervals for these WTP estimates are not provided. The nonrepresentative sample could lead to a false sense of certainty about our predictions for WTP in 18 As individual expected option prices are calculated, rare estimates less than zero are counted as zero. the population as a whole. With a more representative sample of data, it would be advisable to explore other specifications. The asymptotically normal distributions of the maximum likelihood parameter estimates cause trouble when one tries to divide through by 0 β in calculating the option price, OP. The mean of a ratio of normally distributed variables is undefined. While a mean WTP will be observed in any finite sample, the expected value is technically undefined. This degree of rigor allows the estimated model to be solved for the theoretically appropriate valuation construct. However, using this formal model as a starting point for the empirical example quickly reveals that a model which is simply linear in the expected value and variance of the individual's subjective distribution of future average annual temperatures is dominated by richer models that allow for non-constant slopes with respect to mean and variance in the main "index" of the model. We have examined several alternative empirical specifications that do a better job of fitting the data, but these do not sustain an easy, clean mapping back to the underlying indirect utility function. Fortunately, the willingness to pay measures that are relevant to welfare analysis do not really require knowledge of the underlying indirect utility function.
Wherever the estimated parameters of our option price models are statistically significant, their signs are plausible. Knowledge of the nature of heterogeneity in preferences with respect to climate change mitigation will be a very important consideration in the politics of "selling" (or derailing) climate change mitigation policies. We have found persuasive evidence that, even in this small sample, the anticipated scope of climate change in the absence of mitigation makes a statistically significant difference in individuals' willingness to pay for mitigation. Greater climate uncertainty also seems to reduce people's willingness to incur the (E[t] -63.5-3.5) = (E[t]-60). This avoids the problem of taking the log of a negative number for the five observations where expected future average temperature is less than current average temperature. is current annual average temperature. Variation in fitted option prices across the sample is due to heterogeneity in the explanatory variables. Number of observations with negative fitted WTP is reported because functional form does not restrict monthly expected Option Price to be non-negative. The sizes and frequencies of the randomly assigned "bids" in the stated preference experiment may be of interest to some readers. Table A1 WTP by Bid Size (n = 602, n(0)=166, n (1) attained with these two (non-nested) transformation is higher in the logarithmic case, Model EHL-4 is preferred in this class.
Model EHL-4 preserves only the most significant of the interaction terms that have been examined. The WTP surface that is implied by model EHL-2 is depicted in Figure A1 for males with neutral levels of informedness and conservatism, and a midrange probability of remaining in the same region in the future. The figure requires some explanation. There are now three 
